#### **Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative**

# POLITICALLY EXPOSED PERSONS STRENGTHENING PREVENTIVE MEASURES

#### **Strengthening Regional Cooperation**

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## Politically Exposed Persons

- Individuals who are, or have been, entrusted with prominent public functions
- Includes family members and close associates
- Represent a greater ML risk because of the possibility that they will abuse their position and influence to carry out corrupt acts (e.g., extort/pay bribes, steal assets)
- "Not all PEPs are bad" but all require EDD

## Why Focus on PEPs? (1/2)

- Devastating effect on development outcomes.
   Individual PEP can have disproportionate impact.
  - \$1 trillion in bribes each year (World Bank estimate)
  - Marcos (1972 86): \$5 \$10 billion
  - Abacha (1993 98): \$2 \$5 billion
- Portion of the recovered assets could provide much-needed funding for social programs or infrastructure. Every \$100 million:
  - 250,000 household water connections
  - 50-100 million drug treatments for malaria
  - 240 kilometers of two-lane paved road

## Why Focus on PEPs? (2/2)


- Legal and reputational risk to individual bank, and reputational risk to a jurisdiction's financial sector as a whole.
- Standard CDD is not sufficient
- Level the playing field banks are already taking action on PEPs and many go beyond the international standards
- The problem continues: Corrupt PEPs are becoming more effective in hiding their identity through associates, legal entities, and intermediaries.

### Response – UNCAC & FATF

- UNCAC, Article 52 (entered into force Dec 2005):
  - "to conduct enhanced scrutiny of accounts <u>sought or</u> <u>maintained</u> by or on behalf of individuals <u>who are, or</u> <u>have been, entrusted with prominent public functions</u> <u>and their family members and close associates.</u>"
- FATF 40+9 Recommendations: Rec. 6 (June 2003)
  - Risk management systems to identify PEPs
  - Senior management approval
  - Establish source of funds and source of wealth
  - Conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring


## The Reality: Low Compliance

- More than 80% of jurisdictions have not implemented effective measures. Only 3 jurisdictions compliant
- Compliance lower in FATF jurisdictions



#### Link between PEPs and AML Policies

- PEPs should be identified in course of CDD procedures (including identification of beneficial owner)
- Failures in CDD creates risk that PEP will not be identified
- FATF Recommendation ratings build on this link



Recommendation 5 = CDD Recommendation 6 = PEPs

## Little Evidence of Monitoring

#### What is reported by banks?

- No corrupt PEP activity in banks or in other sectors
- Few PEP STRs
- Few investigations or prosecutions for grand corruption

Where is the corrupt money?

# Why is PEPs Compliance a Problem? (1/2)

- Lack of political will
  - Failure to pass and implement legislation and regulations
  - No regulatory sanctions on PEPs
  - Little interest in measuring effectiveness of PEPs measures (e.g., collection of statistics, studies)
  - Few cases

# Why is PEPs Compliance a Problem? (2/2)

 Need for clarification and harmonization of international requirements – differences have led to confusion about definitions and how to implement

	UNCAC	FATF
Basic definition	Individuals who are, or have been, entrusted with prominent public functions, and their family members and associates	Individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign countryBusiness relationships with family members or close associates of PEPs involve reputational risks similar to those with PEPs themselves
Foreign or domestic	Foreign and domestic (not explicit)	Foreign only

 "The classic corrupt PEP is dead" -- corrupt PEPs are using complex corporate and trust arrangements and close associates or relatives to veil the identify of the PEP or the PEP's beneficial ownership

#### Apply EDD to All PEPs, Foreign and Domestic

- UNCAC domestic and foreign PEPs; FATF foreign only
- Why?
  - Legal and reputation risks remain same domestic politicians are subject to same pressures and perverse incentives.
  - Increase credibility of commitment to fighting corruption and money laundering
  - Reality: Many banks are already covering both

#### Require a Declaration of Beneficial Ownership

- Provides background to assist with identification and verification
- Assist regulatory authorities in evaluating BO practices
- Requirement to sign under criminal penalty, where existing, serves as deterrent
- One tool not only tool—to identify and verify BO. Not sufficient to let banks "off the hook"

Form X: Declaration of Ide	entity of the Bene	ficial Owner
[To be executed by the contracting customer in	writing.]	
		Account/Deposit N
Contracting customer:		
(ruii riame and address)		
I, the contracting customer, hereby declare:		
(mark with a "X" where appropriate)		
u that I am the sole beneficial owner* of the	assets in the accoun	t referenced above
	OR	
that the beneficial owner(s) of the as [Provide: Full Name of the natural person(s), Date an port Number, National ID Number or similar national	d place of birth, Nationali	ty, Address/Domicile, Country, Pa
The contracting customer undertakes to [autom		
in any event no less than two weeks] inform Bank contact] in writing about any changes in t		
It is a criminal offense to [deliberately] [intent form [insert applicable criminal law and penalt		erial false information on t
torn [insert approache criminal law and penalt	y iii boid typej.	
Signature(s) of the contracting customer:	Witnessed by I	Bank Official:
Signature(s) of the contracting customer:	Witnessed by I	Bank Official:
		Bank Official:
	Name:	
Signature(s) of the contracting customer:  Date:	Name:	

#### Request Asset and Income Declarations

- Required in more than 110 countries
- Provides a "snapshot in time" that bank can use to compare with profile or account activity
- Addressing refusals
- Issues: Verification is uneven
- Other uses: PEP identification if public list of filers, analysis of STRs by FIUs

#### Periodic Review of PEP Customers

- Review of the "big picture" on risk-based approach, at least yearly
- Helps to overcome silo approach
- Should include consideration by at least one senior manager
- Good Practice: PEPs Committee

## Avoid Setting Limits on the Time a PEP Remains a PEP

- UNCAC and FATF "once a PEP always a PEP"
- Problems with time limits
- Consider on case-by-case basis using riskbased approach

#### Other Recommendations & Issues

- PEPs are an asymmetric risk no one single tool will solve problem
- Ensure inclusion of "family members" and close associated in definition of PEPs.
- Commercial Databases
- Involvement of group AML/CFT compliance officer in decision to accept customer
- Issue: National List of PEPs

## Regulatory Authorities, FIUs

- Include PEPs component in on-site inspections
- "Red flags" or typologies to help identify PEPs, including close associates, and indications of corruption
- Enforcement, use of sanctions
- Guidance on filing PEP STRs
- Collection of statistics

## **National Cooperation & Training**

- Partnerships with government authorities and private sector on PEP issues
  - Strategy
  - implementation of PEPs policy
  - suspicious indicators
  - typologies and trends
- PEP training within banks, regulators, FIU
  - Harm caused, culture of compliance, "red flags"

## THANK YOU

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